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Cert to CA9 (Sneed, 
Anderson, Alarcon) 
'Z 
~o · Jews for Jesus, Inc., e 
~ (pamphleteers) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs argue CA9 erred in holding that the cen-
tral terminal area (CTA) at the Los Angeles International Airport 
(LAX) is a traditional public forum. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petrs are the Board of Air-
port Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles (Board) and the 
City of Los Angeles. Pursuant to authority granted by the city 
charter, the Board manages and controls all airports owned by the -
-"-
city, including LAX. On July 13, 1983, the Board adopt
1
ed a reso- ~ 
' . c.-...1-....<-~ 
lution that prohibited First Amendment activ' ies in ~he CTA of 
LAX. 1 On July 6, 1984, resp Snyder, a member of resp Jews for 
Jesus, Inc., was distributing religious literature on a pedestri-
an walkway in the CTA when he was asked to leave by a LAX peace 
officer. The officer informed re sp of the Board's resolution 
and told him that if he refused to leave, the city would initiate 
legal action. Resp left, and, a few days later, filed suit in de 
seeking a declaration that the Board's resolution was 
unconstituional. The ~c (CD Cal, Rafeedie, J.) determined that 
the ~ was a traditional public forum. The de held the resolu-
tion was unconstitutional on its face and enjoined its enforce-
men~ 
CA9 affirmed. The court noted that both parties agreed that 
the dispositive legal issue was whether the CTA is a public 
forum. The court rejected petr' s argument, which was based on 
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion, 460 u.s. 37 (1983) and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
1Resolution No. 13787 states, in relevant part: 
I •, 
"NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Board 
of Airport Commissioners that the Central 
Terminal Area at Los Angeles International 
Airport is not open for First Amendment 
activities by any individual and/or entity; 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that if any 
individual or entity engages in First Amendment 
activities within the Central Terminal Area of 
Los Angeles International Airport, the City 
Attorney ••• is directed to institute appropriate 
litigation against such individual and/or entity 
II 
Educational Fund, Inc., 105 s.ct. 3439 (1985), that the CTA was 
I 
nonpublic because petr has operated LAX ~olely fo d airport-
,·~ 
related purposes. Resps' reliance on Perry and Cornelius is mis-
placed. Those cases concern whether governmental facilities that 
are not traditional public forums have been opened for First 
Amendment activities. This case, by contrast, involves the sepa-
rate issue of whether LAX is a public forum, ie. whether it is 
one of "those places which by long tradition or by government 
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." Cornelius, 10 5 
S.Ct., at 3349. If it is such a place, "restrictions such as an 
absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be 
upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling govern-
mental interest." United States v. Grace, 461 u.s. 171, 177 
(1983). 
CA9 stated that 1 v .. ery other circui!J that has addressed the 
issue has concluded that airports are public forums. See ~ago 
Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (CA7), 
cert. denied, 421 u.s. 992 (1975) (Chicago O'Hare); United States 
Southwest Africa/Nambia Trade & Cultural Council v. United 
v 
States, 708 F.2d 760 (CADC 1983) (National and Dulles); Fernandes 
v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (CA5 1981) (Dallas-Fort Worth). CA9 con-
eluded that the CTA is a traditional public forum and that the 
Board's interest in limiting the uses of the terminal facilities 
to airport-related purposes was not sufficiently compelling to 
justify absolute prohibition of First Amendment activity. CA9 
noted that the Board was free to impose reasonable time, place, 
-q-
and manner restrictions on the distribution of litera~ure in the 
CTA. ~ 
'I 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that CA9 rested its decision 
on a superficial analysis of current case law and reliance on 
out-dated lower court decisions. CA9 failed "to demonstrate the 
existence of a traditional right of access respecting [interiors 
of airport terminals] for purposes of communication comparable to 
that recognized for streets and parks " City Council v. Tax-
payers for Vincent, 466 u.s. 789, 814 (1984). The interiors of 
the airport terminals are not held in trust to be used by the 
public for assembly and debate, but rather are intended and dedi-
cated to their airport-related purposes. But here, CA9's deci-
sion equates the CTA with traditional public forums such as 
streets, parks, and sidewalks. 
Petrs neither intentionally nor unintentionally opened the 
interiors of its terminals for public discourse. CA9 has disre-
garded the government's right to use its property for its intend-
ed and dedicated purposes, and its decision compels every airport 
operator to open its facilities as public forums restricted only 
by time, place, and manner regulations. The cases from other 
circuits relied upon by CA9 are inapposite. Those cases did not 
address whether an airport was a public forum--the key issue 
here--but rather examined time, place, and manner restrictions 
for airports that had opened their facilities to expressive ac-
tivities. CA9 has concluded essentially that public ownership in 
and of itself creates a public forum, and this conclusion is de-
monstrably wrong. If CA9's decision is allowed to stand, "all 
government-operated facilities, regardless of their intended pur-
l 
poses or dedication, may become mini-parks ~edicated ~t 
est range of activities imaginable." Petn 16. 
the wid-
Resps contend that the cases relied upon by CA9 are clearly 
apposite and petrs' argument to the contrary is erroneous. In 
United States Southwwest Africa/Nambia Trade & Cultural Council, 
supra, the court explicitly stated that the public places at Na-
tional and Dulles airports are "far more akin to such public fo-
rums as streets and common areas than they are to such nonforums 
as prisons, buses, and mi 1 i tary bases." 7 0 8 F • 2d , at 7 6 4 • In 
Fernandes, supra, the court observed that it "is now generally 
well established that airport terminals owned and administered by 
governmental entities are public forums •••. " 663 F.2d, at 626. 
And, in Chicago Area Military Project, supra, the court held the 
plaintiffs were entitled to exercise First Amendment rights in 
the terminal buildings, explaining that "the spacious, city-owned 
common areas ••• resembl~ .those public thoroughfares which have 
been long recognized to be particularly appropriate places for 
the exercise of constitutionally protected rights " 508 
F. 2d , at 9 2 5. 
As to petrs argument that they have not opened the CTA for 
public discourse, resps contend that a governmental entity cannot 
create a public facility that has been traditionally held open to 
the exercise of free speech and then close that forum simply by 
intending that it have some other principal purpose. In Corne-
lius, supra, the Court observed that it looks "to the policy and 
practice of the government to ascertain whether it intended to 
,. .. , 
; designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate 
I 
as a public forum." 105 s.ct., at 3449. Here, the ' ~tipulated 
''j 
facts show that over the past 10 years, resps have permitted a 
variety of religious and political groups to distribute litera-
ture. 
Resps argue that even assuming that the CTA is not a tradi-
tional public forum, any regulation of speech must be reasonable 
and not an effort to suppress particular speech. See Perry, 
supra. Petrs fail to demonstrate a single problem that might 
result from the exercise of First Amendment activities. The un-
disputed facts show that resp Snyder was not impeding the flow of 
pedestrian traffic nor was he touching or harassing any per son. 
Furthermore, petrs permit commercial speech and also have li-
censed the operation of a Christian Science reading room that is 
open to the public. Petrs are therefore in the untenable posi-
tion of arguing in this case that the CTA should be limited to 
ai rpor t-rela ted business while simultaneously they permit other 
activities that are not so related. Finally, the resolution is 
clearly overbroad as it outlaws all "First Amendment activity." 
4. DISCUSSION: CA9's opinion does not contain much "rea-
soned elaboration" in support of its holding that the CTA is a 
traditional public forum. The court correctly sets forth the 
test articulated in Perry that such forums are "places which by 
long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assem-
bly and debate " 460 u.s., at 45. CA9 then proceeds, howev-. . . . 
er, to justify its holding by relying on other circuit cases. 
While this method of argument certainly isn't inappropriate, CA9 
never explains why the CTA at LAX can be considered to be a place 
}\ ' 
devoted to assembly and debate. One can surmise that ~A9 was at 
/t I 
least in p~t influenced by the stipulated facts presented to the 
. 5k~ 
de which the court did not discuss. Significan~ facts included: 
the public is permitted unrestricted access to CTA; a variety of 
groups have engaged in First Amendment activities in the CTA dur-
ing the past 10 years and petrs have been aware of these activi-
ties; the CTA have been used on a number of occasions by print, 
television, and radio media for filming, photographing and/or 
interviewing public figures; artwork created by children has been 
displayed in the CTA with the consent of petrs; a display per-
taining to protected animal species has been constructed in one 
terminal with the consent of petrs; petrs have not and do not 
prohibit persons wearing T-shirts or other articles of clothing 
imprinted with slogans, statements, or other forms of religious 
or political communication from walking in the CTA. See Petn Ap 
1 3-8. 
While strict application of the stipulated facts to the 
legal standard doesn't compel CA9's conclusion that the CTA is a 
traditional public forum, the decision is arguably correct. And, 
given the uniformity among the circuits that have considered the 
issue, I see no reason to review this case. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
September 16, 1986 Burcham Opin in petn. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell January 27, 1987 
From: Leslie 
No. 86-104 
Board of Airport Commns. of LAX v. Jews for Jesus 
Cert. to CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, Alarcon) 
Tuesday, March 3, 1987 (first argument) 
I. Summary 
The question presented in this case is whether an 
airport operator constitutionally may prohibit First Amend-
ment expressive activities within the interior of the air-
port. 
II. Background 
Petrs are the City of Los Angeles and the Board of 
Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. The Board 
pursuant to the city charter manages and controls 1all air-
.~ 
ports owned by L.A., including Los Angeles InterJpational 
Airport (LAX). Resps are a nonprofit religious corporation 
religious faith, Alan Howard Snyder. 
is ~~adopted by the Board 
on July 13, 1983, that pro ide.s-'!..t~ the Central Terminal 
and a minister of the 
The focus of this suit 
Area as Los Angeles International Airport is not open for 
First Amendment activities by an individual and/or entity" 
and that "if any individual or entity engages in First 
Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area as Los 
Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City 
of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litiga-
tion against such individual and/or entity to ensure cornpli-
ance with this Policy Statement of the Board of Airport Corn-
missioners." __..-----, 
On July 6, 1984,~~was distributing free reli-
gious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central Ter-
rninal Area (CTA) at LAX when he was approached by a uni-
formed Department of Airports peace officer. The officer 
showed Snyder a copy of the Resolution, explained that Sny-
der was violating the Resolution, and asked Snyder to leave. 
The officer warned Snyder that if he refused to leave the 
City would take legal action against him. Snyder stopped 
distributing the material and immediately left the terminal. 
On July 17, 1984, Jews for Jesus filed suit in DC ~ 
seeking a declaration of their rights to distribute reli-~ ··-gious literature in public areas in the CTA. Resps raised 
···• 
. :;.-~ ... 
.a;---;J- --
three challenges under both the federal ~nd state Constitu-
·; 
tions: (1) that the resolution was unconstitutiona~ on its 
face because it totally bans First Amendment activities in a 
public forum; ( 2) that the Resolution is unconstitutional 
as applied to resps because it has only been used to ban 
certain types of communicative conduct; and (3) that it is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the term 
"First Amendment activities" does not give guidance to offi-
cials or the public as to what activity is prohibited. 
~ 
Before the DC, the parties orally stipulated to the 5~~~ 
facts, and the DC treated the trial briefs as cross-motions 
for summary judgment. The DC held that the CTA is a tradi-
tional public forum, declared the total ban on First Amend-
ment activities unconstitutional on its face, and declined 
v 
to reach the other issues raised by resps. The CA9 af-
firmed, as follows. 
The Supreme 
Amendment analysis. 
Court has indicated the proper First/.)~!~ 
~52..--t.­
First, the question is whether the 
challenged activity or speech is protected by the First 
Amendment. If it is, the next question is what type of 
forum is at issue. The final question is whether the justi-
fications for exclusion satisfy the standards for the par-
ticular type of forum. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
- - ---~ 
Educational Fund, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3446 (1985). 
There is no question that the distribution of liter-
ature is protected by the First Amendment. The first ques- ;~I ty 
tion in this case is whether the CTA is a public forum. 
This circuit and every other circuit to have addressed the 
' ' 
1 
issue have found that airport terminals are public ') forums. 
Rosen v. City of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981) (Port-
land International Airport); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 
479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973) (Oakland Airport); Chicago Area 
Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 (CA7), 
cert. denied, 421 u.s. 992 (1975) (Chicago O'Hare); United 
States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. 
United States, 708 F. 2d 760 (CADC 1983) (National and 
Dulles); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F. 2d 619 (CAS 1981) 
(Dallas-Fort Worth). According to the reasoning of these 
cases, the CTA is a traditional public forum. The Board's 
interest in limiting the use of the terminal facilities to 
airport-related purposes is not sufficiently compelling to 
justify absolute prohibition of First Amendment activity. 
The Board is free to impose reasonable time, place and man-
ner limitations on the distribution of literature in the 
CTA. 
III. Analysis ~ 
Jurisdictional Questions 
The 
Krishna ess of California, Inc., raises jurisdic-
tional questions not mentioned by either of the parties to -------this suit. The Krishnas successfully convinced another DC 
(Rafeedie, J.) to dismiss an identical suit for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The DC reasoned that there was 
presently no case or controversy before the court. Immedi-
-· 
'. 
ately after the resolution was passed, LAX offici1als dis-, 
. ~ 
tributed copies of the Resolution to Krishna member ~. While 
this may have created a case or controversy, the Krishnas 
stated that their members had not subsequently been harassed 
by airport officials. Additionally, the~~ 
provides that the Board "shall have power • • • to ~e and 
enforce all necessary rules and regulations governing the 
use and control of all municipal airports with the City of 
Los Angeles." The provision then states that "said regula-
tions shall be approved by the~uncil by ordinance which ____________ __,~~.-,._.,,--..... _____ ______ 
shall prescribe the penalties for violation of such rules 
and regulations." Another section states that the general 
manager of the airport department "shall have the power and 
duty to enforce all orders, rules and regulations adopted by 
the Board." The charter does not provide for the Board to ~ ~ 
pass resolutions as it did in this case. 
Council ratified the Board's resolution. 
Nor has the City ~~ 
The DC thus found~ .SA- ,J.,; 
-that enforcement of the resolution was speculative, and ,.~~ 
therefore there did not exist sufficient adversity between c/-
the parties to create a case or controversy. It found that ~ ~ 
~ 
the case was improvidently removed to federal court on the ~-!--
federal issue, and remanded the case to state court. -?--~~ 
The Krishnas argue that this same reasoning applies 
to this case. They claim that the resolution has never been ~ 
formally enforced against anyone since its passage in 1983,~~ 
and that in its present form it cannot be. The Krishnas 
argue that the Court should DIG the case for lack 1of ripe-
ness. 
The Krishnas also argue that a decision on the fed-
eral public forum doctrine will violate the long established 
rule of avoiding federal constitutional adjudication where 
nonfederal grounds for decision are available. The parties 
raised both state and federal constitutional issues below, 
----------------------~-----~ 
and the lower courts improperly reached the federal issues 
before deciding the state ones. California courts have 
found the state Constitution Article I, section 2 to be a 
"protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the 
[federal] First Amendment." Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 
Cal. 3d 652, 658 (1975). Under €!- ifornia 1!0 areas such C~ 
'--'---~---- ~~ . 
as convention centers, shopping centers, prison grounds, 
interior premises of state owned visitor's centers and major ~~f~ 
transportation terminals (main entrance, lobby and patio l<k 
areas of the Union Station railway terminal in L.A.) must be 
made available for the reasonable exercise of First Amend-
--~ ment rights. See citations in Krishna Brief 15. The Krish-
nas argue that the decision below should be vacated and re-
manded for a decision first on the state constitutional 
issue. Resps indicate in a footnote that a state constitu-
tional violation was alleged in the complaint and extensive-
ly argued in the lower courts, but the courts "inexplicably 
ignored the state constitution." Resp. Brief 21, n. 32. 
Both of these jurisdictional arguments are trou-~ 
bling. You might want to sk questions directed 
toward either of these concerns. Perhaps . the factual situa-
tion is different ~the Krishna case. Of partic~lar im-
portance is whether the DC in the Krishna case was correct 
that the Resolution as it now stands is unenforceable. 
There is always the argument that the mere existence of the 
Resolution has in intolerable chilling effect on First ~~~ 
Amendment activity. The DC in the 'K;l-~h;~ case did not find J;::;:;;-
this argument compelling. Also, since only the Krishnas an~~ 
resps have briefed the relevance of state law, there may be ~ 
some arguments against its applicability that are not imme- -~ ~ 
lr'v 
diately obvious. In sum, if there is sentiment at Confer-l ~ 
ence to DIG or vacate and remand the case, it appears a 0 ~ 
this point that either would be justified. 
B. The Merits 
1. Traditional Public Forum 
The first question in this case is whether the CTA 
is a public forum. (Note that only the Central Terminal ~ 
~~ 
Area is at issue, not the terminal areas leading to individ- ~ 
ual gates or directly to the planes.) Traditional public 
forums are "those places which 'by long tradition or by gov-
ernment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.'" 
Cornelius, supra, at 3449 (quoting Perry Education Associa-
tion v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 u.s. 37 
(1983)). "Public streets and parks fall into this catego-
ry." Ibid. Traditional public forums are dedicated to the 
free exchange of ideas. The only restrictions that the gov-
ernment may impose on speech in such areas are those that 
··"·'·· 
' 
are "content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a sig-
i 
nificant government interest, and leave open ample a~ternate 
channels of communication." Perry, supra, at 45. 
The~ound that the CTA is a traditional public 
forum, relyJ.ng largely on the analysis of other circuit 
court cases. This circuit court cases addressed several of 
the argument raised by petrs in this case. In Chicago Area 
Military Project, supra, the~
[ T] he plaintiffs here do not claim any right to 
distribute leaflets on airplanes or in other pri-
vately owned or leased places but only in the spa-
cious, city-owned common areas which resemble 
those public thoroughfares which have been long 
recognized to be particularly appropriate places 
for the exercise of constitutionally protected 
rights to communicate ideas and information •••• 
The City's claim that t e--ptlb~eceives a 
limited invitation to use Hare Airport or trav-
el purposes only is not s ted e evidence 
nor do we think it is realistic. For the fact is 
that great numbers of people are freely admitted 
to the public areas of the terminal buildings not 
only in connection with air travel, but also for 
shopping, dining, sightseeing, or merely to satis-
fy their curiosity. There is no question but that 
the terminal buildings at O'Hare Airport, city-
owned and operated, are freely available to the 
general public and that their wide-open public 
areas which perhaps 90,000 transients visit daily 
can accommodate seven persons peacefully distrib-
uting, in groups of twos and threes, free copies 
of their publication to interested persons. 
508 F. 2d, 
As 
In finding the airport to 
be a public forum, we do n hold that 
within the terminals is public. s the district 
court noted, , those parts of the terminals 
restricted to airline personnel are private, ab-
sent unusual circumstances. Likewise, the arrival 
and departure gates, where only ticketed passen-
gers may go, are not public forums. The parallel 
between public streets and the ciescent-sha~ed 
central concourses of the ••• terminal buildings, 
where air travelers as well as the general public 
may shop, dine, imbibe, and sightsee, is clear and 
powerful, however. The analogy between these ter-
minal concourses and public streets is further 
strengthened by the lack of restrictions on public 
access to the commercial establishments located 
along the crescent-shaped passageways, whether or 
not persons must pass through security check 
points first. 
663 F. 2d, at 627. 
Th~~eached the same result: 
The Council seeks to place its advertisements 
in those open areas of National and Dulles Air-
ports that contain many of the facilities and 
services of a fair-sized municipality. Roughly 
eighteen million people pass through the con-
courses and walkways of these two airports each 
year, enjoying the benefits of restaurants and 
snack bars, two post offices, various speciality 
shops, two medical stations, at least five bars, a 
barber shop, drug stores, banks, newsstands, and 
police stations •••• Although not every form of 
speech is necessarily consistent with t~ai r-
port's primary use, it seems clear that the public 
places in these airports are far more akin to such 
public forums as streets and common areas than 
they are to such nonforums as prisons, buses, and 
military bases. 
708 F. 2d, at 764. 
4 - - J- - -
Petrs argue that the airport has not been opened to 
communicative activities, but instead has been consistently 
devoted to air travel-related activities. Petrs argue that 
this case is like Greer v. Spock, 424 u.s. 828 ( 1976)' 
where the Court found that the exterior sidewalk areas of a 
military base were not to be treated the same as a munici-
pal i ty' s open streets and parks. The circuit courts ad-
dressed these arguments above in a way that seems convinc-
ing. Petrs do not, and cannot, contend that LAX is ,not gen-
i 
erally open to the public. Instead, they argue thcit it is 
not dedicated to expression. But, it seems that concourses 
like those in LAX are dedicated to expression the same way 
as are streets and sidewalks. Both streets and sidewalks 
have purposes other than as forums for communication -- both 
are used for transportation. Their public forum character 
comes from the fact that they are generally open to the pub-
lie and speech activities are not generally incompatible 
with their functional uses. This would seem to be equally 
true for an airport, which is simply a gathering center for 
individuals using a more modern form of transportation. 
The DC' s factual findings support the conclusion 
that the CTA of LAX is generally open to the public and has 
the characteristics of a traditional public forum: 
The [petrs] have not restricted access by mem-
bers of the general public to the interior of ter-
minal areas at LAX to only those persons who are 
engaged in the use of LAX facilities for inter-
state travel of for purposes of meeting or greet-
ing airline passengers. The [petrs] do not at-
tempt to restrict members of the general public 
from walking through the unrestricted interior of 
terminal areas at LAX. [Petrs] do not attempt to 
restrict members of the general public who have no 
purpose or desire to utilize the transportation-
related facilities within the terminal areas at 
LAX from walking, reading, shopping, eating, 
drinking, and conversing with other members of the 
general public in the interior of terminal areas 
at LAX. 
Pet. App. 8. The DC also found that LAX officials had de- ~~ 
ni~ from certain groups to conduct certain activi-~ 
ties in the airport, e.g., the Red Cross, the Girl Scouts,~ --
" ' 
the Salvation Army. Although the findin,gs of fact do not 
il 
make clear exactly what activities these groups SQught to 
conduct, they were almost certainly on a larger scale than a 
few individuals distributing free literature. If these 
groups sought to conduct activities that would interfere 
with the interstate travel function of the airport, reason-
able time, place and manner restrictions could forbid them 
from doing so no matter what type of forum the airport was 
found to be. Consequently, the CA9' s conclusion that the 
CTA has generally been open to reasonable, nondisruptive 
speech activities appears correct. 
2. Nontraditional Public Forum 
Opened For Expressive Activity 
Even if a particular area is not a public forum, it 
can become one if the government "open[s] a nontraditional 
public forum for public discourse." Cornelius, supra, at 
5120. Resps argue that the Board has opened LAX for cornrnu-
~ ~ 
The CTA has newsstands, photo dis-nicative activities. 
~ 
plays, and a C ristian Science Reading Room It is diffi-
-----·--;;-;;---.---.----:-:: 
cult to argue that these are all str ~ctly related to the 
airport function of facilitating air travel. Where the gov-
ernrnent has opened a particular forum, it cannot discrimi-
nate against speakers on the basis of the content of their 
speech. The Resolution bans "all First Amendment activi-
ties." It would seem that the Board would either have to 
ban all of the above First Amendment activities, as well as 
the Jews for Jesus, or allow all to speak. 
'· 
page 12. 
It is important to emphasize that' the CA9 a~d other 
'l 
circuit courts have recognized that all First Amendment ac-
tivities in airport terminals are subject to reasonable 
time, place and manner restrictions. Thus, groups wishing 
to distribute religious literature may be subject to re-
strictions that limit their intrusiveness and ensure that 
their activities do not disturb the primary function of the 
airport. 
3. Compelling Interest 
If the CTA is a traditional public forum, or a forum 
opened for expressive activity, the Board can nevertheless 
prohibit First Amendment activities if its Resolution is 
narrowly drawn and is necessary to serve a compelling inter-
est. It is difficult 't;'- ~ay that a resolution banning "all ~ 
 First Amendment activity" is narrowly drawn. Moreover, the ~~
CA9 appears to have properly found that the Board has no 
compelling interest to support its regulation. The one ar-
ticulated interest is: "The Los Angeles City Charter re-
quires the Board to operate all of its properties for promo-
tion and accommodation of air navigation and air commerce 
and uses incidental thereto." This interest does not appear 
compelling in light of the DC' s factual findings that the 
Board does not limit the CTA to air travel-related activi----------. 
ties in other respects. The ~~that "[i]n ?u>l-
distributing the religious literature, Snyder was not block-~ 
ing any entrance, exit stairway, escalator, elevator, door 
------------.. 
or otherwise inhibiting the free flow of pedestrian traffic" 
page 13. 
and that "Snyder was not touching, annoying, block~ng, ob-
I 
structing, or otherwise harassing any other person present 
in the immediate vicinity of his location on the pedestrian 
walkway." Thus, it appears that the Resolution was not nar-
rowly drawn to accomplish its purpose of preventing inter-
ference with air travel. 
4. Other Arguments 
Resps also argue that the term "First Amendment ac-
tivities" in the Resolution allows airport official imper-
missible discretion to choose which groups will be subject 
to the regulation, that the exercise of the discretion 
amounts to a prior restraint, and the implementation of the 
policy embodies impermissible content discrimination and 
religious discrimination. The CA9 decided only the tradi-
-----~ 
tional public forum question. Thus, it would be inappropri-
---- ~ 
ate for this Court to decide the additional issues raised. 
Even if the Court decides that the CTA is not a public 
forum, the appropriate remedy would be to remand the case to 
the CA9 to decide the other questions raised. 
IV. Conclusion 
There are two preliminary problems in this case. 
First, it appears that the Resolution at issue me.y not be 
enforceable. If it is not, there is a question whether this -action presents a case or controversy. Second, the lower 
federal courts failed to address the state constitutional 
issues although they were briefed and argued, and although 
it appears that the state constitution could have provided 
page 14. 
an independent ground for this decision. 'Given the uniform-
'1 
I 
ity of the circuits on the federal constitutional issue, and 
the availability of state constitutional grounds, the Court 
should consider seriously whether the case should be vacated ---- ---- 8- - ------------... 
and remanded for consideration of the state constitutional 
----- -issue. 
-· If the Court reaches the merits, it appears that the 
CA9 was correct. The wide open spaces of an airport termi- ~ 
nal bear the indicia of a traditional public forum. Al-.....___ ___________., 
though petrs argue that the forum cannot be traditional, 
because airports are modern, the question is whether the 
area is analogous to a traditional public forum. Tradition-
al public forums are streets, sidewalks and parks. The CTA 
in this case contains broad walking areas, with shops and 
restaurants along it, and benches for people to sit in and 
converse. Because of modern technology, airports are in 
fact one of the largest gathering places of all. A holding 
...--. _________ -------- ---
in this case that the CTA is a traditional public forum will 
not apply to all government-owned property. The focus al-
ways remains on the characteristics of the place. Here, the 
characteristics are remarkably similar to classic public 
forums traditionally open for First Amendment activities. 
Even if the CTA is not a traditional public forum, 
it may be a forum opened by the Board for First Amendment r 
activities. The Board allows numerous other speech-related 
activities to occur in the CTA. Thus, it appears that it 
has opened the area to First Amendment activities compatible 
........ 
page 15. 
with the function of the airport -- facilitating air ~ travel. 
''\ 
There is no indication that resps proposed activities are 
incompatible. 
No matter what type of forum the CTA is, the Board 
can impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on 
speakers. These limitations are a narrowly tailored way to 
ensure that speech activities do not intrude on the function 
of the airport. 
For all of the above reasons, I recommend that if 
the Court reaches the merits, the CA9 's decision be af-
~-----------
firmed. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell January 27, 1987 
From: Leslie 
No. 86-104 
Board of Airport Commns. of LAX v. Jews for Jesus 
Cert. to CA9 (Sneed, Anderson, Alarcon) 
Tuesday, March 3, 1987 (first argument) 
I. Summary 
The question presented in this case is whether an 
airport operator constitutionally may prohibit First Amend-
ment expressive activities within the interior of the air-
port. 
II. Background 
Petrs are the City of Los Angeles and the Board of 
Airport Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles. The Board 
pursuant to the city charter manages and controls 'all air-
.~ 
ports owned by L.A., including Los Angeles Inter·pational 
Airport (LAX). Resps are a nonprofit religious corporation 
religious faith, Alan Howard Snyder. 
is ~adopted by the Board 
on July 13, 1983, that pro · de.s- '!-t.7t the Central Terminal 
and a minister of the 
The focus of this suit 
Area as Los Angeles International Airport is not open for 
First Amendment activities by an individual and/or entity" 
and that "if any individual or entity engages in First 
Amendment activities within the Central Terminal Area as Los 
Angeles International Airport, the City Attorney of the City 
of Los Angeles is directed to institute appropriate litiga-
tion against such individual and/or entity to ensure cornpli-
ance with this Policy Statement of the Board of Airport Corn-
rni s sione r s. " .----·--.... 
On July 6, 1984,~~was distributing free reli-
gious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central Ter-
rninal Area (CTA) at LAX when he was approached by a uni-
formed Department of Airports peace officer. The officer 
showed Snyder a copy of the Resolution, explained that Sny-
der was violating the Resolution, and asked Snyder to leave. 
The officer warned Snyder that if he refused to leave the 
City would take legal action against him. Snyder stopped 
distributing the material and immediately left the terminal. 
On July 17, 1984, Jews for Jesus filed suit in DC ~ 
seeking a declaration of their rights to distribute reli-~ 
gious literature in public areas in the CTA • Resps raised 
. 
• :,~". ~·~·-r.. ; 
three challenges under both the federal and state eonstitu-
I; 
tions: (1) that the resolution was unconstitutionaf on its 
face because it totally bans First Amendment activities in a 
public forum; ( 2) that the Resolution is unconstitutional 
as applied to resps because it has only been used to ban 
certain types of communicative conduct; and (3) that it is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the term 
"First Amendment activities" does not give guidance to offi-
cials or the public as to what activity is prohibited. 
~ 
Before the DC, the parties orally stipulated to the 5~~~ 
facts, and the DC treated the trial briefs as cross-motions 
for summary judgment. The DC held that the CTA is a tradi-
tional public forum, declared the total ban on First Amend-
ment activities unconstitutional on its face, and declined 
v 
to reach the other issues raised by resps. The CA9 af-
firmed, as follows. 
The Supreme 
Amendment analysis. 
Court has indicated the proper First~~!~ 
~5t..--L. 
First, the question is whether the 
challenged activity or speech is protected by the First 
Amendment. If it is, the next question is what type of 
forum is at issue. The final question is whether the justi-
fications for exclusion satisfy the standards for the par-
ticular type of forum. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
-·- --~ 
Educational Fund, Inc., 105 s. Ct. 3439, 3446 (1985). 
There is no question that the distribution of liter-
ature is protected by the First Amendment. The first ques- ;~I cy 
tion in this case is whether the CTA is a public forum. 
This circuit and every other circuit to have addressed the 
I ~· 
issue have found that airport terminals are public j forums. 
Rosen v. City of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981) (Port-
land International Airport); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 
479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973) (Oakland Airport); Chicago Area 
Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 (CA7), 
cert. denied, 421 u.s. 992 (1975) (Chicago O'Hare); United 
States Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. 
United States, 708 F. 2d 760 (CADC 1983) (National and 
Dulles); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F. 2d 619 (CAS 1981) 
(Dallas-Fort Worth). According to the reasoning of these 
cases, the CTA is a traditional public forum. The Board's 
interest in limiting the use of the terminal facilities to 
airport-related purposes is not sufficiently compelling to 
justify absolute prohibition of First Amendment activity. 
The Board is free to impose reasonable time, place and man-
ner limitations on the distribution of literature in the 
CTA. 
A. 
III. Analysis ~ 
Jurisdictional Questions 
The International Society for 
Krishna ness of California, Inc., raises jurisdic-
tional questions not mentioned by either of the parties to 
---.._...--
this suit. The Krishnas successfully convinced another DC 
(Rafeedie, J.) to dismiss an identical suit for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. The DC reasoned that there was 
presently no case or controversy before the court. Immedi-
ately after the resolution was passed, ~AX offici1als dis-
.~ 
tributed copies of the Resolution to Krishna member~. While 
this may have created a case or controversy, the Krishnas 
stated that their members had not subsequently been harassed 
by airport officials. Additionally, the~_!:~ 
provides that the Board "shall have power ••• to ~e and 
enforce all necessary rules and regulations governing the 
use and control of all municipal airports with the City of 
Los Angeles." The provision then states that "said regula-
tions shall be approved by the~uncil by ordinance which ___________ __,'-l.----a..-. .--.. ____ __ 
shall prescribe the penalties for violation of such rules 
and regulations." Another section states that the general 
manager of the airport department "shall have the power and 
duty to enforce all orders, rules and regulations adopted by 
pass resolutions as it did in this case. 
Council ratified the Board's resolution. 
--
therefore there did not exist sufficient adversity between 
the parties to create a case or controversy. 
-
federal issue, and remanded the case to state court. 
The Krishnas argue that this same reasoning applies 
to this case. They claim that the resolution has never been ~ 
formally enforced against anyone since its passage in 1983,~~ 
and that in its present form it cannot be. The Krishnas 
argue that the Court should DIG the case for lack 1of ripe-
ness. 
The Krishnas also argue that a decision on the fed-
eral public forum doctrine will violate the long established 
rule of avoiding federal constitutional adjudication where 
nonfederal grounds for decision are available. The parties 
raised both state and federal constitutional issues below, 
and the lower courts improperly reached the federal issues 
before deciding the state ones. California courts have 
found the state Constitution Article I, section 2 to be a 
"protective provision more definitive and inclusive than the 
[federal] First Amendment." Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 
('>A. I 
Cal. 3d 652, 658 (1975). Under ~~iii) areas such ~r 
~:.:.__ ~f . 
as convention centers, shopping centers, prison grounds, 
interior premises of state owned visitor's centers and major ~~~ 
transportation terminals (main entrance, lobby and patio l<k 
areas of the Union Station railway terminal in L.A.) must be 
made available for the reasonable exercise of First Amend-
-------------------------------------~ ment rights. See citations in Krishna Brief 15. The Krish-
nas argue that the decision below should be vacated and re-
manded for a decision first on the state constitutional 
issue. Resps indicate in a footnote that a state constitu-
tional violation was alleged in the complaint and extensive-
ly argued in the lower courts, but the courts "inexplicably 
ignored the state constitution." Resp. Brief 21, n. 32. 
Both of these jurisdictional arguments are trou- /~ 
bling. You might want to sk questions directed 
~-----------
toward either of these concerns. Perhaps the factual situa-
tion is different ~the Krishna case. Of partic~lar im-
portance is whether the DC in the Krishna case was correct 
that the Resolution as it now stands is unenforceable. 
There is always the argument that the mere existence of the 
Resolution has in intolerable chilling effect on First ~~f 
Amendment activity. The DC in the 'Krishna case did not find ~ 
this argument compelling. Also, since only the Krishnas an~~ 
resps have briefed the relevance of state law, there may be ~ 
some arguments against its applicability that are not imme- -~~ 
lr'v 
diately obvious. In sum, if there is sentiment at Confer-l ~ 
ence to DIG or vacate and remand the case, it appears a :J ~ 
this point that either would be justified. 
B. The Merits 
1. Traditional Public Forum 
The first question in this case is whether the CTA 
is a public forum. 
Area is at issue, not 
{Note that only the Central Terminal ~ 
~h4..12 
the terminal areas leading to individ- ~ 
ual gates or directly to the planes.) Traditional public 
forums are "those places which 'by long tradition or by gov-
ernment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.'" 
Cornelius, supra, at 3449 {quoting Perry Education Associa-
tion v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 U.S. 37 
{1983)). "Public streets and parks fall into this catego-
ry." Ibid. Traditional public forums are dedicated to the 
free exchange of ideas. The only restrictions that the gov-
ernment may impose on speech in such areas are those that 
February 4, 1987 
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Jesus (CA9) 
Memo to File: 
Although the two questions on which we granted cert. 
are stated in some detail, the courts below and both 
parties here agree that the central question is whether 
the Los Angeles Airport is a "public forum." 
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners 
of the City adopted a resolution that states in part: 
"Now, therefore be it resolved by the Board of 
Airport Commissioners that the central term~nal 
area at Los Angeles International Airport i§_Qpt 
o en fo First Amendment activ'ties by any 
ind1v1dual and or entity; ••• " 
In July 1984, Snyder--a minister of Jews for Jesus--
was distributing free religious literature on a pedestrian -
walkway in the central terminal area when a uniformed 
--....... 
officer read Snyder the resolution, and threatened to have 
2. 
legal action taken against him unless he stopped 
distributing the leaflets. Shortly thereafter, respondent 
and Snyder (hereafter "the respondents") filed this 
Section 1983 suit seeking a declaration of their rights to 
distribute religious literature in the public areas of the 
airport. Respondents, in their complaint, challenged the 
validity of the resolution under both the federal and 
state constitutions on three grounds: (i) on its face, 
because it totally bans First Amendment activities in a 
public forum; (ii) that it is unconstitutional as applied 
to respondents because it has only been used to ban 
certain kinds of communicative conduct such as that of 
distributing leaflets by respondents; and (iii) that the 
resolution is "vague and overbroad." Bath the DC and 
CA9 held the resolution invalid o~ts face, and therefor 
did not reach the "as applied" and "vague and overbroad" 
issues. 
There is a rather elaborate stipulation of facts in 
Appendix 1 to the petition for cert. These indicate the 
sort of activities we're all familiar with in airport 
v-- ~ 
terminals, including advertisements, restaurants, 
._..--
newsstands,~all shops,~s, and the like. The City (I 
use it rather than the Board of Airport Commissioners) 
3. 
asserts that it has never intentionally or knowingly 
permitted the airport to be used except for "airport 
related activities", although this is a term not defined 
in the resolution at issue or--as far as I know--anywhere 
else. 
The courts below, both the DC and CA9, had no 
difficulty in concluding rather summarily that this type 
of airport is a "public forum." In addition to 
emphasizing that literally millions of people use the L.A. 
Airport annually, including a significant number of people 
who are not necessarily there for airport purposes. The 
City argues quite reasonably that if Jews for Jesus are 
permitted to hand out pamphlets, hundreds of political, 
religious, charitable and other types of entities may wish 
to do likewise. Moreover, in a rather silly brief filed 
on behalf of a AFL-CIA, it is argued that under the 
Airport Resolution that bans "First Amendment activities 
by any individual and or entity", even a single individual 
could not hand out pamphlets, engage in political 
conversation, try to persuade a friend or acquaintance to 
a particular point of view, or do much more of anything 
other than board or leave airplanes, wait for airplanes, 
4. 
or accompany people who are flying in or out of airports 
to meet them or bid goodbye. 
The courts below naturally and properly relied on 
decisions that have held other major airports in the 
United States to be "public foria", including O'Hare, 
Dulles, National, Dallas, and perhaps others. I believe 
these decisions have emphasized, as indeed the courts 
below did, that "time, place, and matter" regulations 
would be entirely appropriate if reasonably related to 
preventing the sort of problems that the City emphasizes 
in its briefs. It is conceded that the Board of Airport 
Commissioners of Los Angeles preferred the absolute ban to 
"time, place and matter regulations", and this is the 
position taken in this case. 
* * * 
In light of the posture in which this case is 
presented to us, namely, as a facial challenge to a 
resolution that provides an absolute ban on any "First 
Amendment activity", it is not easy to see how we can do 
otherwise than to affirm CA9. Indeed, a good deal can be 
said for dismissing the case as improvidently granted. I 
regret that although I had marked my cert memo to deny, I 
5. 
was persuaded at conference to "join three"--without 
having read the briefs. 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-104 
BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY 
OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEWS 
FOR JESUS, INC. AND ALAN HOWARD SNYDER, 
AKA AVI SNYDER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF c=...~ ,.,_.__ 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1987] 
JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The petitioner Board of Airport Commissioners seeks 
review of the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit that Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is a 
"public forum" under the Federal Constitution. Because the 
Court of Appeals failed to address respondents' parallel and 
potentially dispositive claim under the California Constitu-
tion, we vacate the judgment below and remand for consider-
ation of the state law claim. 
I 
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners 
(Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the 
Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Termi-
nal Area at Los Angeles lhternational Airport is not 
open for First Amendment activities by any individual 
and/or entity; 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effective 
date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or entity 












2 AIRPORT COMM'RS v. JEWS FOR JESUS, INC. 
the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International 
Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be deemed to 
be acting in contravention of the stated policy of the 
Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to the uses 
permitted within the Central Terminal Area at Los An-
geles International Airport; and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that if any individual or 
entity engages in First Amendment activities within the 
Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Air-
port, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is di-
rected to institute appropriate litigation against such 
individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this 
Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commission- ·· 
ers. . . . " App. 4a-5a. 
Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc. is a non-profit religious 
corporation. On July 6, 1984, Alan Howard Snyder, a minis-
ter of the Gospel for Jews for Jesus, was stopped by a De-
partment of Airports peace officer while distributing free 
religious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central 
Terminal Area at LAX. The officer showed Snyder a copy 
of the resolution, explained that Snyder's activities violated 
the resolution, and requested that Snyder leave LAX. The 
officer warned Snyder that the City would take legal action 
against him if he refused to leave as requested. App. 
19a-20a. Snyder stopped distributing the leaflets and left 
the airport terminal. App. 20a. 
Jews for Jesus and Snyder then filed this action in the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California, challenging 
the constitutionality of the resolution under both the Califor-
nia and Federal Constitutions. First, respondents con-
tended that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under 
Art. I, § 2 of the California Constitution and the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it 
bans all speech in a public forum. Second, they alleged that 
the resolution had been applied to Jews for Jesus in a dis-
86-104-0PINION 
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criminatory manner. Finally, respondents urged that the 
resolution is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
When the case came before the District Court for trial, the 
parties orally stipulated to the facts, and the District Court 
treated the trial briefs as cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. The District Court held that the Central Terminal 
Area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and 
held that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under 
the United States Constitution. The District Court declined 
to reach the other issues raised by Jews for Jesus, and did 
not address the constitutionality of the resolution under the 
California Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. 785 F. 2d 791 (1986). Relying on Rosen 
v. Port of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981), and 
Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973), 
the Court of Appeals concluded that "an airport complex is a 
traditional public forum," 785 F. 2d, at 795, and held that 
the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the Fed-
eral Constitution. We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --
(1986), and now vacate and remand. 
II 
In their complaint, Jews for Jesus alleged a violation of the ~ 
Ca~~!!Etion as well as the Federal Constitution. 
The Lio erty of s-peech Clause of the California Constitution 
provides: 
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his 
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or 
abridge liberty of speech or press." Cal. Const., Art. I, 
§ 2(a). 
In recent years, the California courts have interpreted the 
California Liberty of Speech Clause to provide greater pro-
tection for expressive activity than that provilled by- the 
First Amen me o e mted States Constitution. Wil-
son v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P. 2d 116, 120 
86-104-0PINION 
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(1975) (The California Liberty of Speech Clause is "more de-
finitive and inclusive than the First Amendment"). Most no-
tably, the California courts have adopted a view of "public 
forum" under the Liberty of Speech Clause that is more ex-
pansive than that expressed by this Court in cases arising 
under the First Amendment. Under the First Amendment, 
this Court has stated that a public forum must be either a 
"traditional" public forum such as a street or park that has by 
long tradition been devoted to assembly or speech, or a "des-
ignated" public forum such as a municipal theater created by 
government designation as a place of communication. Cor-
nelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,-- U.S. 
--, -- (1985)i Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. · 
Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983). The California Courts 
have adopted a different approach. In In re Hoffman, 67 
Cal. 2d 845, 434 P. 2d 353 (1967), the California Supreme 
Court held that a railway terminal was a public forum be-
cause expressive activity was not inconsistent with the use of 
the terminal: 
"The primary uses of municipal property can amply be 
protected by ordinances that prohibit activities that in-
terfere with those uses. Similarly, the primary uses of 
railway stations can be amply protected by ordinances 
prohibiting activities that interfere with those uses. In 
neither case can First Amendment activities be prohib-
ited solely because the property involved is not main-
tained primarily as a forum for such activities. 
"[I]n the present case, the test is not whether petition-
ers' use of the station was a railway use but whether it 
interfered with that use." 67 Cal. 2d, at 850-851, 434 P. 
2d, at 356. 
Although In re Hoffman itself did not clearly indicate that l 
it rested on state law, the California courts have subse-
quently cited it as an aid to interpretation of the California 
Constitution. Thus, in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Cen-
l; 
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ter, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P. 2d 341 (1979), aff'd, 447 U. S. 74 
(1980), the California Supreme Court held that private shop-
ping malls are public fora under the California Liberty of 
Speech Clause, relying in part on In re Hoffman, supra, de-
spite the fact that this Court had already held in Tanne~. 
Lloy orp., a., 4 7 U. S. 551 (1972), that t e ederal 
Constitution offered no such protection for expressive activi-
ties. See also Prisoners Union v. California Department of 
Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d 930, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1982) 
(prison parking lot is public forum under California Constitu-
tion); University of California Nuclear Weapons Labs Con-
version Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 154 Cal. 
App. 3d 1157, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1984) (visitor center is a · 
public forum under California Constitution). 
Under the California Liberty of Speech Clause, therefore, 
the "public forum" doctrine "is not limited to traditional pub-
lic f~ts, sid wa s, an ~ s or ~ites 
de ative activity such as municipal the-
aters. Rather, the test under alifornia law is whether the 
communicative activity 'is basically incompatible with the 
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.'" 
Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F. 2d 1039, 1045 (CA9 
1985), quoting Prisoners Union v. California Department of 
Corrections, supra, at 939, 185 Cal. Rptr., at 639. 
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
described California's Liberty of Speech Clause as providing 
"greater protection for expressive activity" than the First 
Amendment, Carreras v. City of Anaheim, supra, at 1044, 
n. 7, nevertheless both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeal failed to address respondents' claim that the resolu-
tion was facially unconstitutional under the California Con-
stitution. Yet, under this Court's precedents federal courts 
normally must address dispositive issues of state law before 
considering claims under the Federal Constitution. In City 
of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283 (1982), 
this Court remanded to the Court of Appeals a constitutional 
~ 
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challenge to a city ordinance governing coin-operated amuse-
ment establishments because the ordinance might violate the 
Texas Constitution. We observed that "the language of the 
Texas constitutional provision is different from, and arguably 
significantly broader than, the language of the corresponding 
federal provisions," id., at 293, and noted that "there is no 
need for decision of the federal issue" if the state constitution 
provided "independent support" for the plaintiff's requested 
relief. Id., at 294-295. We concluded, consistent with this l 
Court's "policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of 
federal constitutional issues," ibid. , that under these circum-
stances the case must be remanded to determine whether the 
case could be resolved under the Texas Constitution. Simi:.. 
larly, this Court has on several occasions remanded a case on 
Pullman abstention grounds when the apphcat10n of a state 
cons 1 ut10na pro ision might prevent the need to reach a 
Federal Constitutional issue. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 
U. S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); City 
of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639 
(1959). Thus, as a result of these precedents, "[t]here exists 
a growing recognition among Federal Courts of Ap eals that 
it is incum ent u on em to reso ve issues of s ate con-
sti utionailaw efore reac -ing Issues ansing under the Fed-
era onstltution." Delaware v. an rs a l, -- U. S. 
--:-=-----;TI. 15 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Indeed, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit itself has done pre-
cisely that in applying the "public forum" principles of Cali-
fornia constitutional law rather than the First Amendment to 
invalidate a city ordinance banning solicitation at the Ana-
heim Stadium and Anaheim Convention Center. Carreras 
v. City of Anaheim, supra, at 1042-1043. 
The principle that federal courts should avoid resting a de-
cision on Federal Constitutional grounds if a case can be de-
cided on the basis of state law follows from the more general 
and longstanding principle that federal courts should avoid 
unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional issues. 
. ~ 
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See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 
288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). As early as 
1909, this Court recognized that federal courts should avoid 
federal constitutional issues if a case can be decided on pend-
ent state law grounds. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville 
R . R., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 
415 U. S. 528, 547 (1974) ("Numerous decisions of this Court 
have stated the general proposition endorsed in Siler . . . . 
These and other cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the 
federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where 
not absolutely essential to disposition of a case"). "[l]f a con-
troverted question of state law underlay the question of fed-
eral law, it -[is] the district court's duty to decide the· state 
question first . . . in order to avoid if possible a federal 
constitutional question." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro 
& H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and 
the Federal System 989 (2d ed. 1973). State constitutional 
provisions that do more than merely mirror Federal Con-
stitutional guarantees offer no less compelling a ground for 
decision than state statutes and case law. Cf. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 652-653 (1979) (observing that some 
State constitutional provisions will be interpreted by State 
Courts to mirror Federal constitutional law). Particularly 
when, as is the case here, the state constitution may provide 
greater protection for individual rights than the United 
States Constitution, the resolution of the federal claim may 
be unnecessary to support the plaintiff's claim for relief. See 
Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the 
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 
1099-1100 (1974) ("When state law is truly clear and when 
ruling on it would dispose of the case, it would seem appro-
priate for the federal court to rule on the state issue even if 
the federal constitutional question is also clear and 
nonsensitive"). 
In addition, principles of federalism compel the conclusion 
that federal courts should first examine legitimate state con-
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stitutional claims, if their resolution is clear as a matter of 
state law, before reaching any Federal Constitutional issues. 
State constitutional law, no less than Federal Constitutional 
law, has an important role to play in the protection of individ-
ual rights. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the 
States' bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980); Bren-
nan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). But if state constitu-
tional law is to play this role, the federal courts, no less than 
the state courts, may be called upon to recognize and apply 
settled state constitutional norms. 
In this case several factors strongly counsel in favor of first 
addressing the respondents' . pendent state claim before · 
reaching the Federal Constitutional issues. Respondents' 
claim under the California Constitution is potentially dispos-
itive, and is based on a state constitutional provision that 
does not merely mirror the Federal Constitution. The Cali-
fornia Courts have given the concept of "public forum" a set-
tled meaning under the California Constitution that offers 
broader protection to expressive activity in public facilities 
than that under the First Amendment. There exists "[n]o 
reason for hasty decision of the [federal] constitutional ques-
tion presented by this case." City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's 
Castle, Inc., supra, at 294. Because the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals simply ignored respondents' claim 
under the California Liberty of Speech Clause, we vacate the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered . 
lsg 04/09/87 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell April 9, 1987 
From: Leslie 
No. 86-104, Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews For Jesus 
Justice O'Connor's draft Court opinion is now circulat-
ing. The Confe renee voted to dec ide this case on the federal 
constitutional ground of overbreadth. The opinion, however, re-
mands the case for consideration of the state constitutional is-
----...__. ---
sues. This resolution seems desirable because the lower courts 
should not have ignored the state law claim. The decision will 
stand as a message to the lower courts in all types of cases and 
should reduce the federal questions that are unnecessarily decid-
ed. In sum, I think that decision on this ground is more mean-
ingful than would be the decisfon on overbreadth. I recommend 
that you join the opinion. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
' 
.ltpt"tmt (lf&ttttt of tift~~ .tatu' 
J[ulfinghm. ~. Of. 2llgi~~ 
86-104 -
April 10, 1987 
Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra, 
I thought the conference vote was to rule that the 
First Amendment did not require that this airport be 
considered a public forum but that the ordinance is 
nevertheless overbroad and unconstitutional. I do not 
disagree with your discussion of how the federal court 
should have proceeded, and it would appear that the 
courts below disregarded these prudential ground rules. 
But they are not jurisdictional; and here both courts 
dealt with the First Amendment issue, and we granted 
certiorari to decide that question, which was briefed, 
argued and submitted. Nor was it argued at the 
certiorari stage that the court below should have 
decided the case on state law grounds. In the 
interests of running our own business efficiently and 
avoiding any misapprehension about the federal law, I 
would much rather express our disagreement on the 
public forum issue as a matter of First Amendment law 
and reverse outright, leaving the state law question 
for decision on remand. Or I could go on and, as the 
conference voted, say that the ordinance is fatally 
overbroad under the First Amendment. In the course of 
doing this, we could express our view as to how the 
courts should have proceeded but did not. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
.Bu.prtnu (lf.ourf d IJtt ~ittb .lltait.e' 
'JIMJringtDn, J. Of. 2llc?,.~ 
. 
'I ,, ''l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
' .. 
' 
April 10, 1987 
Re: 86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews 
for Jesus 
Dear Byron, 
I realize the conference expressed a 
willingness to address the public forum issue and 
overbreadth, but, in reviewing the proceedings below, 
it seemed to me the Court of Appeals should have 
decided the state law question rather than to decide 
the case on the basis of federal 1st Amendment 
doctrine. For us to reinforce that error by repeating 
it here seemed to me to send the wrong signal. 
Perhaps it would be helpful in the long run to vacate 
l
and direct the Court of Appeals to consider the state 
law question in these circumstances. If, after 
reviewing the circulating draft, the Conference 
remains of the view that federal public forum doctrine 
should be the basis for our decision, I will abide by 
that decision. 
Justice White 









JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.iu.prtmt C!Jcttri of tfrt ,-mtta .Jta:tt• 
JfuJringtctt. ). QJ. 20~'l~ 
April 12, 1987 
1 
'l / 
Re: No. 86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for 
Jesus 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
With regard to Byron's comments and your response thereto, 
my recollection of the sense at conference was that First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, and not the public forum 
doctrine, was to be the basis of the court's decision. There was 
not a court, as I recall, to affirm on the public forum grounds. 
Since the judgment is to affirm, however, any discussion of the 
public forum question would be unnecessary to the judgment, and 
thus merely dictum. Accordingly, if you should decide to 
withdraw the current draft, my sense would be that the Court 
opinion should simply address the overbreadth issue, and leave 
the public forum question to another day. 
Sin~ 
Justice O'Connor 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.jttpttmt <!fouri of tqt ~~ ,jta.ttg 
:JIJultittghtn. ~. <If. 2tl~'l~ 
Apr1l 13, 1987 
' ij 
''\ 
Re: No. 86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners 
v. Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra, 
I agree with much of what Byron said in his earlier 
letter to you in this case. The issue for which I thought 
we took the case, and which was fully briefed, was whether 
the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding as a matter of 
federal constitutional law that Los Angeles International 
Airport was a "public forum" for purposes of First Amendment 
doctrine. I had also thought that there were five votes at 
Conference to say the Court of Appeals was wrong in this 
part of its opinion. 
I have some reservations about the approach which your 
present opinion takes to resolving this case, although it 
may be that after fuller consideration I would agree with 
you. I had not read John's opinion in City of Mesquite v. 
Aladdin's Castle, Inc. -- which I joined -- as broadly as 
you have. I thought in that case we had simply required the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to tell us whether it 
based its decision on state law or federal constitutional 
law. It also seems clear to me that if the respondent here 
were a state actor for Eleventh Amendment purposes, the 
Court of Appeals could not grant relief on a state law basis 
under Lewis' recent opinion in Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 
u.s. 89. I do not think either of these points is 
dispositive against the conclusion that you reach, but they 
make me reluctant to join your present draft without further 
consideration and perhaps additional briefing and argument. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS Of 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
Jnprtm.t ~DUrt &tf lJtt ~iltb Jtatt.e 
~ulfinghm. '· ~. 21T.?'!~ 
April 13, 1987 
Re: No. 86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of the City 
of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
We have never said that it is reversible error for a 
federal court to fail to resolve a state-law issue before 
reaching a federal constitutional claim, and I am not persuaded 
that it is. There are countervailing policies here: the policy 
of avoiding federal constitutional issues versus the policy of 
avoiding pronouncements on state-law quest1ons. I am not willing 
to say that giving preference to the latter is reversible error, 
unless the dispositive nature of the state law is entirely clear. 
Otherwise (since I know of no basis for imposing a "state-law-
first" rule on state courts), we will have created the perverse 
situation in which one is significantly more likely to obtain a 
decision on a state question in federal court, and on a federal 
question in state court. I would not regard the dispositive 
nature of state law to be entirely clear if this Court feels it 
necessary to remand rather than decide the state-law issue on its 
merits. If an opinion can be written limiting the scope of the 
new principle to "clearly dispositive state grounds," and 
persuasively finding such grounds present in this case, I will 
join. 
Otherwise, while I share Bill's aversion to dicta, it 
seems to me we should decide this case on the important point for 
which we took it: public forum doctrine as applied to airports. 
That can be done, without offending our new no-dicta rule, by 
following Byron's suggestion that we reverse on the public forum 
question and remand for the remainder, including both over-
breadth and state law. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
~uvuUtt aro-mn Hrt ~b ~htttlf l; 
.. U'Jringhm. ~. ar. 2.(}~,.~ ! 'l 
CHAMeERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 13, 1987 
Re: 86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of 
the City of Los Angeles v. Jews 
for Jesus, Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
In my opinion it is perfectly clear that the 
Board's blanket prohibition against "First Amendment 
activities" is unconstitutional on its face 
regardless of whether or not LAX is a public forum. 
I could join a brief opinion affirming on that ground 
without volunteering any opinion on the public forum 
issue. As presently advised, however, I do not 
believe I could join an opinion that reaches out to 
engage in an unnecessary disquisition about either 
public forums or public fora. 
If you are going to lecture the Ninth Circuit 
for bypassing the state law ground, I completely 
agree with you that we should practice what we 
preach--at least in the case in which we give the 
sermon. Thus, I will join your opinion if your 
proposed disposition receives the support of a 
majority (including my vote). 
Respectfully, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
-
;lnvrtutt <!fond of tlrt ~b ~taue 
'lhte4Utgton. ~.<!f. 21l,?~~ 
CHAM!IERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
April 14, 1987 
Re: No. 86-104-Bd. of Airport Commissioners of the City 
of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Justice O'Connor 




April 14, 1987 
86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v. 
,Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra: 
I would pref:er to decide the federal publi.c forum 
question, as this is the issue on which we granted. It is 
of interest 5n a number of states that have major airports. 
I would not be inclined to dissent, however, if 
there is a Court for your suggested d i.sposit ion. 
Justice O'Connor 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
' 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~ 
No. 86-104 /.c, ~ 
BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY 
OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEWS 
FOR JESUS, INC. AND ALAN HOWARD SNYDER, 
AKA A VI SNYDER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1987] 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
The Court chooses to decide this case on a ground that was 
neither briefed nor argued by the parties. It concludes that 
a federal court exercising "federal question" jurisdiction and 
presented with a substantial claim under the United States 
Constitution must nonetheless decline to consider that claim 
because plaintiff's claim under the California state constitu-
tion might prove dispositive. The Court thus extends sub-
stantially the established principle that a federal court must 
resolve federal statutory claims before reaching federal con-
stitutional claims. 
The principles governing the jurisdiction and practice of 
federal courts are presently and unhappily very complex, and 
this decision bids fair to make them more so. Federal courts 
are told to abstain from decision of federal questions when 
difficult and unsettled questions of state law must be re-
solved in order to reach a federal question. Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 236 (1984); Railroad 
Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U. S. 496 (1941). But this sort of 
abstention is invoked so that state courts may decide the diffi-
cult and unsettled questions of state law. Federal courts are 
also admonished to abstain from deciding a federal question 
presented to them in an area heavily regulated by local au-
.. 
86-104-DISSENT 
2 AIRPORT COMM'RS v. JEWS FOR JESUS, INC. 
thorities, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315 (1943), but 
this abstention, too, is in the interest of obtaining a decision 
from state authorities on questions of state law. See e. g., 
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United 
States, 424 U. S. 800, 814 (1976). Finally, federal courts 
may not decide federal questions presented to them in a case 
where a pending state proceeding is already underway, and 
must actually dismiss the federal action. Ohio Civil Rights 
Comission v. Dayton Christian Schools, -- U. S. --
(1986); Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). 
In another line of cases relating to pendent jurisdiction, 
which is what is involved here, we have said that "needless 
decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of 
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by pro-
curing for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." 
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966). It 
seems to me that the result the Court reaches today is likely 
contrary to this part of Gibbs; federal courts are now told to 
proceed and decide state law questions over which they have 
only pendent jurisdiction before they may reach the federal 
constitutional claim upon which the jurisdiction of the federal 
court is based. Though the power of courts to proceed in this 
way may be clear, Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 213 
U. S. 175, 193 (1909), a rule requiring this course of action is 
an extreme example of the "non-federal tail.. wag[ging] the 
federal dog." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, and H. 
Wechsler, Hart & Wechler's The Federal Courts and the 
Federal System 926 (2d ed. 1973). 
The cases cited by the Court do not support the rule it an-
nounces today. Our decision in City of Mesquite v. Alad-
din's Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283 (1982), did not admonish the 
lower court for failing to decide state issues preliminary to 
consideration of federal issues. Instead, the Court found it-
self unable to determine whether the decision under review 
had in fact been one of state or federal law. Because a deci-
sion on the basis of state law would not have supported this 
'• 
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Court's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(2), we 
remanded the case for clarification of the basis for the court's 
decision. We did not suggest that it had to decide the case 
on the basis of state law; instead we asked for a clear state-
ment of whether its decision rested on state or federal law. 
Nor is the Court's decision strengthened by its citation of 
cases involving the Pullman abstention doctrine. Ante, at 
6, citing Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U. S. 476 (1971) (per 
curiam); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); City of Me-
ridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639 (1959) 
(per curiam). The Court apparently views these cases as 
establishing a general principle of "state law first." What it 
ignores is the fact that this principle was applied so that un-
settled questions of state law would be decided by the state 
courts. Avoidance of constitutional issues in those cases, 
therefore, was achieved without any interference of the fed-
eral judiciary into questions of state law. Here, by contrast, 
the Court contemplates a resolution of state law by federal 
courts; surely, different considerations apply. 
I think it is unwise for the Court to erect still another rule 
requiring federal courts to avoid the merits of federal con-
stitutional claims without full briefing and argument by the 
parties on that subject. I think the Court ought to reach the 
merits of the federal constitutional issue decided by the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case, but since 
the Court chooses not to do so I refrain from expressing any 
view on that question. 
2nd DRAFT 






From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: _________ _ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 86-104 
BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY 
OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEWS 
FOR JESUS, INC. AND ALAN HOWARD SNYDER, 
AKA A VI SNYDER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1987] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The petitioner Board of Airport Commissioners seeks 
review of the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit that Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is a 
"public forum" under the Federal Constitution. Because the 
Court of Appeals failed to address respondents' parallel and 
potentially dispositive claim under the California Constitu-
tion, we vacate the judgment below and remand for consider-
ation of the state law claim. 
I 
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners 
(Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the 
Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Termi-
nal Area at Los Angeles International Airport is not 
open for First Amendment activities by any individual 
and/or entity; 
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effec-
tive date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or 
entity seeks to engage in First Amendment activities 
0' 
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within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be 
deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy 
of the Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to 
the uses permitted within the Central Terminal Area at 
Los Angeles International Airport; and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that if any individual or 
entity engages in First Amendment activities within the 
Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International Air-
port, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is di-
rected to institute appropriate litigation against such 
individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this 
Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commission-
ers .... " App. 4a-5a. 
Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc. is a non-profit religious 
corporation. On July 6, 1984, Alan Howard Snyder, a minis-
ter of the Gospel for Jews for Jesus, was stopped by a De-
partment of Airports peace officer while distributing free 
religious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central 
Terminal Area at LAX. The officer showed Snyder a copy 
of the resolution, explained that Snyder's activities violated 
the resolution, and requested that Snyder leave LAX. The 
officer warned Snyder that the City would take legal action 
against him if he refused to leave as requested. App. 
19a-20a. Snyder stopped distributing the leaflets and left 
the airport terminal. App. 20a. 
Jews for Jesus and Snyder then filed this action in the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California, challenging 
the constitutionality of the resolution under both the Califor-
nia and Federal Constitutions. First, respondents con-
tended that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under 
Art. I, § 2 of the California Constitution and the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution because it 
bans all speech in a public forum. Second, they alleged that 
the resolution had been applied to Jews for Jesus in a dis-
' , .. , .! 
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criminatory manner. Finally, respondents urged that the 
resolution is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 
When the case came before the District Court for trial, the 
parties orally stipulated to the facts, and the District Court 
treated the trial briefs as cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. The District Court held that the Central Terminal 
Area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and 
held that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under 
the United States Constitution. The District Court declined 
to reach the other issues raised by Jews for Jesus, and did 
not address the constitutionality of the resolution under the 
California Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. 785 F. 2d 791 (1986). Relying on Rosen 
v. Port of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981), and 
Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973), 
the Court of Appeals concluded that "an airport complex is a 
traditional public forum," 785 F. 2d, at 795, and held that 
the resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the Fed-
eral Constitution. We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --
(1986), and now vacate and remand. 
II 
In their complaint, Jews for Jesus alleged a violation of the 
California Constitution as well as the Federal Constitution. 
The Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution 
provides: 
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his 
or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for 
the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or 
abridge liberty of speech or press." Cal. Canst., Art. I, 
§ 2(a). 
In recent years, the California courts have interpreted the 
California Liberty of Speech Clause to provide greater pro-
tection for expressive activity than that provided by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Wil-
son v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P. 2d 116, 120 
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(1975) (The California Liberty of Speech Clause is "more de-
finitive and inclusive than the First Amendment"). Most no-
tably, the California courts have adopted a view of "public 
forum" under the Liberty of Speech Clause that is more ex-
pansive than that expressed by this Court in cases arising 
under the First Amendment. Under the First Amendment, 
this Court has stated that a public forum must be either a 
"traditional" public forum such as a street or park that has by 
long tradition been devoted to assembly or speech, or a "des-
ignated" public forum such as a municipal theater created by 
government designation as a place of communication. Cor-
nelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,-- U.S. 
--, -- (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. 
Ass'n, 460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983). The California Courts 
have adopted a different approach. In In re Hoffman, 67 
Cal. 2d 845, 434 P. 2d 353 (1967), the California Supreme 
Court held that a railway terminal was a public forum be-
cause expressive activity was not inconsistent with the use of 
the terminal: 
"The primary uses of municipal property can amply be 
protected by ordinances that prohibit activities that in-
terfere with those uses. Similarly, the primary uses of 
railway stations can be amply protected by ordinances 
prohibiting activities that interfere with those uses. In 
neither case can First Amendment activities be prohib-
ited solely because the property involved is not main-
tained primarily as a forum for such activities. 
"[I]n the present case, the test is not whether petition-
ers' use of the station was a railway use but whether it 
interfered with that use." 67 Cal. 2d, at 850-851, 434 P. 
2d, at 356. 
Although In re Hoffman itself did not clearly indicate that 
it rested on state law, the California courts have subse-
quently cited it as an aid to interpretation of the California 
Constitution. Thus, in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Cen-
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ter, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P. 2d 341 (1979), aff'd, 447 U. S. 74 
(1980), the California Supreme Court held that private shop-
ping malls are public ·fora under the California Liberty of 
Speech Clause, relying in part on In re Hoffman, supra, de-
spite the fact that this Court had already held in Tanner v. 
Lloyd Corp., Ltd., 407 U. S. 551 (1972), that the Federal 
Constitution offered no such protection for expressive activi-
ties. See also Prisoners Union v. California Department of 
Corrections, 135 Cal. App. 3d 930, 185 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1982) 
(prison parking lot is public forum under California Constitu-
tion); University of California Nuclear Weapons Labs Con-
version Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 154 Cal. 
App. 3d 1157, 201 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1984) (visitor center is a 
public forum under California Constitution). 
Under the California Liberty of Speech Clause, therefore, 
the "public forum" doctrine "is not limited to traditional pub-
lic forums such as streets, sidewalks, and parks or to sites 
dedicated to communicative activity such as municipal the-
aters. Rather, the test under California law is whether the 
communicative activity 'is basically incompatible with the 
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."' 
Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F. 2d 1039, 1045 (CA9 
1985), quoting Prisoners Union v. California Department of 
Corrections, supra, at 939, 185 Cal. Rptr., at 639. 
Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
described California's Liberty of Speech Clause as providing 
"greater protection for expressive activity" than the First 
Amendment, Carreras v. City of Anaheim, supra, at 1044, 
n. 7, nevertheless both the District Court and the Court of 
Appeal failed to address respondents' claim that the resolu-
tion was facially unconstitutional under the California Con-
stitution. Yet, under this Court's precedents federal courts 
normally must address dispositive issues of state law before 
considering claims under the Federal Constitution. In City 
of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283 (1982), 
this Court remanded to the Court of Appeals a constitutional 
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challenge to a city ordinance governing coin-operated amuse-
ment establishments because the ordinance might violate the 
Texas Constitution. We observed that "the language of the 
Texas constitutional provision is different from, and arguably 
significantly broader than, the language of the corresponding 
federal provisions," id., at 293, and noted that "there is no 
need for decision of the federal issue" if the state constitution 
provided "independent support" for the plaintiff's requested 
relief. I d., at 294-295. We concluded, consistent with this 
Court's "policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of 
federal constitutional issues," ibid., that under these circum-
stances the case must be remanded to determine whether the 
case could be resolved under the Texas Constitution. Simi-
larly, this Court has on several occasions remanded a case on 
Pullman abstention grounds when the application of a state 
constitutional provision might prevent the need to reach a 
Federal Constitutional issue. See Askew v. Hargrave, 401 
U. S. 476 (1971); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U. S. 82 (1970); City 
of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U. S. 639 
(1959). Thus, as a result of these precedents, "[t]here exists 
a growing recognition among Federal Courts of Appeals that 
it is incumbent upon them to resolve issues of state con-
stitutional law before reaching issues arising under the Fed-
eral Constitution." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, -- U. S. 
--, --, Fl. 15 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). Indeed, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit itself has done pre-
cisely that in applying the "public forum" principles of Cali-
fornia constitutional law rather than the First Amendment to 
invalidate a city ordinance banning solicitation at the Ana-
heim Stadium and Anaheim Convention Center. Carreras 
v. City of Anaheim, supra, at 1042-1043. 
The principle that federal courts should avoid resting a de-
cision on Federal Constitutional grounds if a case can be de-
cided on the basis of state law follows from the more general 
and longstanding principle that federal courts should avoid 
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See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 
288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). As early as 
1909, this Court recognized that federal courts should avoid 
federal constitutional issues if a case can be decided on pend-
ent state law grounds. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville 
R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 
415 U. S. 528, 547 (1974) ("Numerous decisions of this Court 
have stated the general proposition endorsed in Siler .... 
These and other cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the 
federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where 
not absolutely essential to disposition of a case"). "[l]f a con-
troverted question of state law underlay the question of fed-
eral law, it [is] the district court's duty to decide the state 
question first . . . in order to avoid if possible a federal 
constitutional question." P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro 
& H. Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and 
the Federal System 989 (2d ed. 1973). State constitutional 
provisions that do more than merely mirror Federal Con-
stitutional guarantees offer no less compelling a ground for 
decision than state statutes and case law. Cf. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 652-653 (1979) (observing that some 
state constitutional provisions will be interpreted by state 
courts to mirror Federal constitutional law). Particularly 
when, as is the case here, the state constitution may provide 
greater protection for individual rights than the United 
States Constitution, the resolution of the federal claim may 
be unnecessary to support the plaintiff's claim for relief. See 
Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the 
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 
1099-1100 (1974) ("When state law is truly clear and when 
ruling on it would dispose of the case, it would seem appro-
priate for the federal court to rule on the state issue even 
if the federal constitutional question is also clear and 
nonsensitive"). 
In addition, principles of federalism compel the conclusion 
that federal courts should first examine legitimate state con-
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stitutional claims, if their resolution is clear as a matter of 
state law, before reaching any Federal Constitutional issues. 
State constitutional law, no less than Federal Constitutional 
law, has an important role to play in the protection of individ-
ual rights. See Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the 
States' bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379 (1980); Bren-
nan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977). But if state constitu-
tional law is to play this role, the federal courts, no less than 
the state courts, may be called upon to recognize and apply 
settled state constitutional norms. In circumstances in 
which the state law is neither clear nor dispositive, of course, 
countervailing policies of federalism suggest that the federal 
court should avoid "needless decisions of state law." United 
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966). But 
where the applicable principle of state law is properly raised 
as a pendent state claim, and the state law on the issue is 
both entirely clear and completely dispositive of the case, 
there is no cause for concern about federal "interference . . . 
into questions of state law," post, at--, that would justify 
departure from the "fundamental rule of judicial restraint" 
that federal courts should avoid unnecessary adjudication of 
federal constitutional issues. Three Affiliated Tribes of 
Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U. S. 138, 
157 (1984). 
In this case several factors strongly counsel in favor of first 
addressing the respondents' pendent state claim before 
reaching the Federal Constitutional issues. Respondents 
raised the state law issue in the courts below, and in this 
Court they discussed the applicability of the California Con-
stitution to this case, noted that the state constitutional issue 
had been extensively briefed and argued below, and observed 
that "[t]he corollary to the general principle that decision of 
federal constitutional questions should be avoided when pos-
sible . . . applies equally when the pendent state ground is 
the state constitution rather than a statute." Brief for Re-
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spondents 21, n. 32. Moreover, when a rule of judicial re-
straint and prudence is at issue, this Court is not necessarily 
limited by the issues raised by the parties in this Court. In-
deed, in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U. S. 496 (1941), 
prudential considerations led this Court to apply an absten-
tion doctrine that was neither briefed nor argued by the par-
ties. Respondents' claim under the California Constitution 
is potentially dispositive, and is based on a state constitu-
tional provision that does not merely mirror the Federal Con-
stitution. The California Courts have given the concept of 
"public forum" a settled meaning under the California Con-
stitution that offers broader protection to expressive activity 
in public facilities than that under the First Amendment. 
There exists "[n]o reason for hasty decision of the [federal] 
constitutional question presented by this case." City of Mes-
quite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., supra, at 294. Because the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals simply ignored re-
spondents' claim under the California Liberty of Speech 
Clause, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
Even if the Court of Appeals, as a prudential matter, 
should have decided the case on State-law grounds, it did not, 
and the Federal issue has been briefed and argued here in 
this Court. In these circumstances, we should not waste the 
effort we have expended on this case. The Federal issue 




..hprmtt <!fourl 4tf tq~ ~~ .Blatt• 
.u!tiqt~ !J. Of. 20~Jl.~ 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
May 8, 1987 
.. 
Re: No. 86-104, Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra: 
This case, as for most of the rest of us, has given me difficul-
ty. After reading the proposed opinions and the correspondence~ my 
preference now is to dec' the case on overbreadth. This means that 
I do not join your op1nion as prese r1 I would hope that 
the case could be decided on overbreadth without getting into the 
entanglements of the public forum issue. I am not sure, from the 
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Now that Harry has indicated he will not be 
joining my circulating opinion in this case I will go 
back to the drawing board and address the public forum 
and overbreadth issues. It may take a couple of 
weeks. 
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Since the overbreadth issue is clearly 
dispositive in this case, I see no need to address 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~~-r 5 --- No. 86-104 BOARD OF AIRPORT COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY 
OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JEWS 
FOR JESUS, INC. AND ALAN HOWARD SNYDER, 
AKA A VI SNYDER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1987] 
JusTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue presented in this case is whether a resolution 
banning_@ "First Amendment activities" at Los Angeles In-
ternational Airport (LAX) violates the First Amendment. 
I 
On July 13, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners 
(Board) adopted Resolution No. 13787, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the 
Board of Airport Commissioners that the Central Termi-
nal Area at Los Angeles International Airport is not 
open for First Amendment activities by any individual 
and/or entity; 
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that after the effec-
tive date of this Resolution, if any individual and/or 
entity seeks to engage in First Amendment activities 
within the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport, said individual and/or entity shall be 
deemed to be acting in contravention of the stated policy 
of the Board of Airport Commissioners in reference to 
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the uses permitted within the Central Terminal Area at 
Los Angeles International Airport; and 
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that if any individual 
or entity engages in First Amendment activities within 
the Central Terminal Area at Los Angeles International 
Airport, the City Attorney of the City of Los Angeles is 
directed to institute appropriate litigation against such 
individual and/or entity to ensure compliance with this 
Policy statement of the Board of Airport Commissioners . 
. . . " App. 4a-5a. 
Respondent Jews for Jesus, Inc. is a nonprofit religious 
corporation. On July 6, 1984, Alan Howard Snyder, a minis-
ter of the Gospel for Jews for Jesus, was stopped by a De-
partment of Airports peace officer while distributing free 
religious literature on a pedestrian walkway in the Central 
Term1na1 A.~"'eofficer showed Snyder a copy 
of the resolution, explained that Snyder's activities violated 
the resolution, and requested that Snyder leave LAX. The 
officer warned Snyder that J.he Cit~ would take legal action 
agamst1iliiilr he refused to leave as requested. 1 d., at 
19a-20a. Snyder stopped distributing the leaflets and left 
the airport terminal. I d., at 20a. 
Jews for Jesus and Snyder then filed this action in the Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California, challenging 
the constitutionality of the resolution under both the Califor-
nia and Federal Constitutions. ~' respondents con-
tended that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under 
Art. I, § 2 of the California Constitution and the First 
Amendment to the United States ~itution because it 
bans all ..speech in a Jl.Ublic forum. Seeemf. they alleged that 
th~esolution had bee~d to Jews for Jesus in a dis-
criminatory manner. ~ re_§Qondents urged that the 
resolution was unconstitutiOnally vague and overbroad. 
When the case came before the District C"ourtror trial, the 
parties orally stipulated to the facts, and the District Court 
treated the trial briefs as cross-motions for summary judg-
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ment. The District Court held that the Central Terminal 
Area was a traditional public forum under federal law, and 
held that the resolution was facially unconstitutional under 
the United States Constitution. The District Court declined 
to reach the other issues raised by Jews for Jesus, and did 
not address the constitutionality of the resolution under the 
California Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. 785 F. 2d 791 (1986). Relying on Rosen 
v. Port of Portland, 641 F. 2d 1243 (CA9 1981), and 
Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F. 2d 1130 (CA9 1973), 
the Court of Appeals concluded that "an airport complex is a 
traditional public forum," 785 F. 2d, at 795, and held that the 
resolution was unconstitutional on its face under the Federal 
Constitution. We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1986), 
and now affirm, but on different grounds. 
------, 
II 
In balancing the government's interest in limiting the use 
of its property against the interests of those who wish to use 
the property for expressive activity, the Cou~'!!'tified 
three types of for~onal public fo e public 
forum create"d by government designation, and onpublic 
forum. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 
460 U. S. 37, 45-46 (1983). The proper First Amendment 
analysis differs depending on whether the area in question 
falls in one category rather than another. In a traditional 
public forum or a public forum by government designation, 
we have held that First Amendment protections are subject 
to Qeightened . ..8.G!_utiny: 
"In these quintessential public f6rums, the government 
may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the 
State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show 
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve 
that end. . . . The State may also enforce regulations of 
the time, place, and manner of expression which are con-
.. 
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tent-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and leave open ample alternative 
channels of communication." I d., at 45. 
We have further held, however, that access to a nonpublic 
forum may be restricted by government regulation as long as 
the regulation "is reasonable and not an effort to suppress ex-
pression merely because officials oppose the speaker's view." 
Id., at 46. 
The petitioners contend that LAX is neither a traditional 
public forum nor a public forum by government desi~ation, 
and accordingly argue that the latter standard governing ac-
cess to a nonpublic forum is appropriate. The respondents, 
in turn, argue that LAX is a public forum subject only to rea-
sonable time, place or manner restrictions. Moreover, at 
least one commentator contends that Perry does not control a 
case such as this in which the respondents already have ac-
cess to the .airport, and therefore concludes that this case is 
analogous to Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U. S. 
503 (1969). See Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Si-
lence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private 
Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1, 48 (1986). Because we con-
clude that the resolution is facially unconstitutional under the 
the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine regardless of the 
proper standard, we need not decide whether LAX is indeed 
a public forum, or whether the Perry standard is applicable 
when access to a nonpublic forum is not restricted. 
Under the First Amendment o~d.Q§rine, an in-
dividual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is 
permitted to challenge a statute on its face "because it also 
threatens others~those who desire to 
engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain 
from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to 
have the law declared partially invalid." Brockett v. Spo-
kane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 503 (1985). A statute 
may be invalidated on its e~ly if the over-
breadth is "substantial." Houston v. Hill,-- U. S. --, 
il 
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- (1987); New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769 (1982); 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973). There-
quirement that the overbreadth be substantial arose from our 
recognition that application of the overbreadth doctrine is, 
"manifestly, strong medicine," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 
supra, at 613, and that "there must be a realistic danger that 
the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized 
First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court 
for it to be facially challenged on overbreadth grounds." 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 801 
(1984). 
On its face, the resolution at issue in this case reaches the 
"
1
universe of expressive activity, and, y pro ~all pro-
tecte-o create a virtual "First Amend-
ment Free Zone" at LAX. The resolution does not merely 
regulate expressive activity in the Central Terminal Area 
that might create problems such as congestion or the disrup-
tion of the activities of those who use LAX. Instead, the 
resolution expansively states that LAX "is not open for First 
Amen men ac iv1 ies by any inaividual anaTor entity," and 
that ny 1 1vi al an or entity [w o] see s o engage in 
First Amendment activities within the Central Terminal 
Area ... shall be deemed to be acting in contravention of the 
stated policy of the Board of Airport Commissioners." App. 
4a-5a. The resolution therefore does not merely J:.Qaek mass 
~iGHs and--leaflQtting at LAX; it prohibits even talk-
-o ing and reading, or the wearing of campaign buttons or sym-
bolic clothing. Under such a sweeping ban, virtually every 
individual who enters LAX may be found to violate the reso-
lution by engaging in some "First Amendment activit[y]." 
We think it obvious that such a ban cannot be justified even if 
LAX were a nonpublic forum because no conceivable govern-
, •. ~, /.J... me~stify such an absolute prohibition of 
. .J , y ~ · speech. 
~ , Additionally, we find no a rent s ing construction of 
~f ~J,t<--- the resolution. The resolution expressly applies to all irst 
;;::: ~~ ~tp-
f<tJV- ~ .J#,I ~ 
~'r.~ 
~ 
~. ~ ,. 
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Amendment activities," and the words of the resolution sim-
ply leave no room for a narrowing construction. In the past 
the Court sometimes has used either abstention or certifica-
tion when, as here, the state courts have not had the opportu-
nity to give the statute under challenge a definite construc-
tion. See, e. g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National 
Union, 442 U. S. 289 (1979). Neither option, however, is 
appropriate in this case because California has no certifica-
tiotL,proc~dure, and the resolution is~ tO an 
interpretation which Woilla rendef"'unnecessaryorsubstan-
tiall modify t e e era constitutional question." Harmon 
v. Fors~8, 535 1965). The difficulties in 
adopting a limiting construction of the resolution are not un-
like those found in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964). 
At issue in Baggett was the constitutionality of several stat-
utes requiring loyalty oaths. The Baggett Court concluded 
that abstention would serve no purpose given the lack of any 
limiting construction, and held the statutes unconstitutional 
on their face under the First Amendment overbreadth doc-
trine. We observed that the challenged loyalty oath was not 
"open to one or a few interpretations, but to an indefinite 
number," and concluded that "[i]t is fictional to believe that 
anything less than extensive adjudications, under the impact 
of a variety of factual situations, would bring the oath within 
the bounds of permissible constitutional certainty." I d., at 
378. Here too, it is difficult to imagine that the resolution 
could be limited by anything less than a series of adjudica-
tions, and the chilling effect of the resolution on protected 
speech in the meantime would make such a case-by-case ad-
judication intolerable. 
The petitioners suggest that the resolution is not substan-
tially overbroad because it is intended to reach only expres-
sive activity unrelated to airport-related purposes. Such a 
limiting construction, however, is of little assistance in sub-
stantially reducing the overbreadth of the resolution. Much 
nondisruptive speech-such as the wearing of a T -Shirt or 
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button that contains a political message-may not be "airport 
related," but is still protected speech even in a nonpublic 
forum. See Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (1971). 
Moreover, the vagueness of this suggested construction itself 
presents serious constitutional difficulty. The line between 
airport-related speech and nonairport-related speech is , at 
best, murky. The petitioners, for example, suggest that an 
individual who reads a newspaper or converses with a neigh-
bor at LAX is engaged in permitted "airport-related" activity 
because reading or conversing permits the traveling public to 
"pass the time." Reply Brief for Petitioners 12. We pre-
sume, however, that petitioners would not so categorize the 
activities of a member of a religious or political organization 
who decides to "pass the time" by distributing leaflets to fel-
low travelers. In essence, the result of this vague limiting 
construction would be to give LAX officials alone the power 
to decide in the first instance whether a given activity is air-
port related. Such a law that "confers on police a virtually 
unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a vi-
olation" of the resolution is unconstitutional because "[t]he 
opportunity for abuse, especially where a statute has re-
ceived a virtually o en-ended interpretation, is self-evident." 
Lewis v. C · o ew Or s, 415 U. S. 130, 135-136 (1974); 
see a ouston v. Hill, U. S., at--; Kolender v. 
Laws , 461 U. S. 352, 3 (1983). 
We cone resolution is substantially overbroad, 
and is not fairly subject to a limiting construction. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the resolution violates the First Amend-
ment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
MEMORANDUM 
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ground appeared fine to me as well. The overbreadth issue is an 
,( ' " 
alternate ground for ~ng th~ jud~ent b~low, whereas if the 
r . 
Court reached the public forum issue, it would reverse the judg-
ment. You indicated in your memo to Justice O'Connor that you J ~ 
thought the public forum issue should be addressed. You could 
request that Justice O'Connor first could address the public 
forum issue and then affirm the lower court judgment based on 
overbreadth. This, however, would seem at odds with the Court's 
' 
policy of not reaching unnecessary constit~tional is$ues. Aneth-
er consideration is that the Court is split on whether the public 
forum issue need be addressed. It may be better for the Court to 
wait to address the public forum issue until all the Justices 
believe that the issue is prope~ly In sum, I believe 
that onnor's resolution is If you think 
that the need to address the public forum issue is of overriding 
importance, however, you may want to defer joining the opinion 
until it is evident how many other Justices share your view. 
j;lt.Jlrttttt <qcurt ttf tqt ~ittb ,jtatt~ 
Jht,glfingtttn, ~. <q. 2ll&t'!~ 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
,, '. ):,r; .. ~·-.i', .·. 
( . 
May 27, 1987 
Re: 86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews 
for Jesus, Inc. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am circulating herewith a revised approach 
in this case. The Court is divided on the 
desirability of resolving the public forum issue. 
Having "tinkered" with several versions, I have 
decided there is no nee esolve e bli orum 
question in light the ove~rlth b~lding. 






~upumt Qf4tltrl .o:f tlrt ~nitn ~hrlt.­
J[rurJringt.o:n. ~. elf. 21lp'!~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
May 27, 1987 
Re: 86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of 
the City of Los Angeles v. Jews 
for Jesus, Inc. 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice O'Connor 






JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
j}uprmtt Qfttlttt of tfrt ~b jlhttt• 
~ulfiughtn. ~. <lf. 2Ll~'l-~ 
May 28, 1987 
Re: No. 86-104 Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE:RS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~u:.prtm.t Qicu.rt of t4t ~b ~tatte 
11taefringtcn. ~. Qt. 2ll&f~;t 
/ 
May 29, 1987 
Re: No. 86-104-Bd. of Airport Commissioners of the 
City of LA v. Jews For Jesus 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me in your latest draft (5/27/87). 
Justice O'Connor 




May 29, 1987 
86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v. 
Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra: 




cc: The Conference 
, . .. , 
May 29, 1987 
86-104 Board of Airport C'..ommiss toners 
Jews for Jesus 
near Sandra: 
Although I have ioined your Court opinion in this case, 
I would appreciate your taking a look at the sentence in the 
first full paragraph of paqe 5 that begins: "The resolution 
therefore does not merely reach mass demonstrations and 
leafletting at LAX 1 ••• " 
I would prefer saying that the resolutj.on "0oes not 
reach merely the activity of respondents at LAY.; ••• " ~he 
sentence as it now reads mav suggest an unduly narrow scone 




CH AMBERS OF 
~u;trtmt <!ltt1trl oJ tlrt ~tb ~taft.&' 
Jlagftinghtn. ~. <!l· 2lJp~~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE June 1, 
86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners of 
the City of Los Angeles v. Jews 
for Jesus, Inc. 
Dear Sandra, 
I join your opinion but will write a 
word or two on the side. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~n.vrttttt Cltlmrt o-f tqt 'Jnitta ~tatt.s' 
~a$ftington, ~. ar. 2.0.;i~~ ' 
June 1, 1987 
No. 86-104 Bd. of Airport Commrs. v. 
Jews for Jesus 
Dear Lewis, 
I have incorporated your suggested change 




THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
..iu.prtntt Clfltltri gf t!rt ~b ..itatt.e 
~a.e!fittghtn. ~. <fl. 20~~~ 
June 2, 1987 
Re: 86-104 - Board of Airport Commissioners v. 
Jews for Jesus 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your concurring opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!IERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
;iupttutt arourl of tqt ~b .jtzdts 
Jfaslfinghtn. ~. <!f. 2ll~~~ 
June 2, 1987 
Re: 86....:104 - Board of Airport Commissioners v. 
Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS 0~ 
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
.tupr.tm~ QI&mrt Df tJrt ~ittb .ttatt• 
)lulfbtgton. J. QI. 2D?~' 
June 3, 1987 
Re: No.86-104 - Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus 
Dear Sandra: 
I would be pleased to join your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBE:RS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
ju.prtm.e atourt of t~t ~iitb ..it'ltt.s 
Jla.tYftiugton. ~. Of. 21lbi~~ · 
June 4, 1987 
No. 86-104 Bd. of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus 
Dear Chief, 
This case was scheduled to come down next week, but it 
contains references to Houston v. Hill, No. 86-243. I would 
prefer to leave the citations and postpone announcing this case 
until Houston v. Hill is ready for announcement. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
86-104 Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus (Leslie) 
SOC for the Court 3/9/87 
1st draft 4/9/87 
2nd draft 5/1/87 
Joined by BRW 4/12/87 
TM 4/14/87 
CJ dissenting 
1st draft 4/29/87 
Joined by AS 5/6/87 
BRW dissenting 
1st draft 5/1/87 
SOC withdrew opinion 
soc for the Court 
1st draft 5/27/87 
2nd draft 6/1/87 








1st draft 6/2/87 
2nd draft 6/3/87 
Joined by CJ 6/2/87 
BRW will write a word or two 6/1/87 
